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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1160 
___________ 
 
ANDREW FULLMAN, 
                             Appellant  
 
 v. 
 
 CITY OF PHILADELPHIA;  
 RASHEEN DICKERSON; STEPHEN CASSIDY;  
 JARED KRZYWICKI; TERRANCE LYNCH; OFFICER MITCHELL; JOHN DOE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-01536) 
District Judge:  Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 24, 2017 
Before:  VANASKIE, COWEN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 17, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Andrew Fullman seeks review of the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment to defendants in his suit brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.         
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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§ 1343 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1218.  For the reasons set forth below, we will 
affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. 
This matter has a complicated procedural history which is familiar to all parties, so 
we need not fully recite it here.  In summary, from 2008 to 2010, Fullman filed three 
separate complaints against, inter alia, the City of Philadelphia, the Philadelphia Police 
Department, and numerous police officers alleging violations of his civil and 
constitutional rights.  Each case was placed in suspense at Fullman’s request due to his 
mental health condition at the time.  In June 2014, the cases were removed from civil 
suspense, and Fullman was given leave to file an amended complaint consolidating his 
claims; the District Court ordered that the claims would “relate back, respectively, to the 
filing of the original complaint in each case from which the claim was first asserted.”  
District Ct. Docket #48 at pg. 2.  The operative complaint at issue, Fullman’s third 
amended complaint filed on August 25, 2011,1 named as defendants the City of 
Philadelphia, Police Officers Rasheen Dickinson, Jared Krzywicki, Terrance Lynch, 
Mitchell, and John Doe, and Police Lieutenant Stephen Cassidy.  It alleged claims of 
excessive force, denial of due process and equal protection, and “harassment and 
retaliation,” as well as a claim under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA).   The 
claims stemmed from three separate incidents, as well as several traffic stops, involving 
                                              
1 Although it was captioned as the “Second Amended Consolidated Complaint,” we agree 
with the District Court that this was the third amended complaint. 
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Fullman and Philadelphia police officers.2  The District Court granted summary judgment 
to the defendants, and this appeal ensued.3 
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of an order 
granting summary judgment is plenary.  DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 
2004).  Summary judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d 
Cir. 2006).   
Fullman raises four issues on appeal:  (1) Whether the statute of limitations period 
should be tolled to the time when the amended complaint was filed; (2) Whether the 
December 7, 2006 letter satisfies the Monell standards for custom or policy; (3)  Whether 
the trial court overstepped its role of gatekeeper and stepped into the shoes of the jury 
with respect to the question of whether the force used was necessary and/or excessive; 
and (4) Whether the trial court’s alleged “bias toward the plaintiff clouded the court’s 
judgment and prevented impartiality as a result of his prior unrelated lawsuits.”  We 
consider no other question on appeal because Fullman, by failing to raise any additional 
                                              
2 The facts underlying these incidents are fully set forth by the District Court in its 
opinion.  
3 A subsequent motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) was denied.  
Because Fullman has not filed a new or amended notice of appeal, our jurisdiction is 
limited to the District Court’s underlying order granting summary judgment.  See Fed. R. 
App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). 
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issues, waived any further challenge to the District Court’s decision.  See United States v. 
Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“an appellant's failure to identify or argue an 
issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal”); see also LoSacco v. 
City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1995) (although “appellate courts generally 
do not hold pro se litigants rigidly to the formal briefing standards . . . we need not 
manufacture claims of error for an appellant proceeding pro se, especially when he has 
raised an issue below and elected not to pursue it on appeal”). 
Fullman sought to impose liability on the City of Philadelphia for the acts of its 
police officers and the Police Department.  The District Court determined that Fullman 
failed to state a claim for relief because the City cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action 
on a theory of respondeat superior, and Fullman failed to allege facts demonstrating the 
existence of a municipal policy or custom that led to the alleged constitutional violation.  
See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); Mulholland v. Gov’t 
Cty. of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir. 2013).  In the “Questions Presented” section of 
his brief, Fullman disputes the District Court’s determination under Monell.  Appellees 
argue, correctly, that he has waived this issue by failing to further address it in his brief.  
See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993) (“appellants are required to set 
forth the issues raised on appeal and to present an argument in support of those issues in 
their opening brief) (emphasis added).  In any event, the claim is meritless for the reasons 
stated by the District Court.  In particular, we note that the December 2006 letter from 
Lieutenant John Echols does not acknowledge a “pattern of harassment” by the police; 
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instead, it evidences that Fullman’s complaints were being investigated and, to that point, 
all ten had been unsustained.  See Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 799 (8th 
Cir. 1998) (noting that to establish liability under Monell, there “must also be some 
showing that the [underlying] complaints had merit”).   
The District Court concluded that the claims against defendants Dickerson, 
Cassidy, and Krzywicki, which arose out of an incident that occurred on April 3, 2008, 
were time-barred.  In their brief on appeal, Appellees assert that the District Court erred 
in failing to determine that the amended complaint could “relate back” to the original 
complaint filed on April 5, 2010, because it was filed within the statute of limitations.  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B).  We agree.  Claims brought pursuant to § 1983 are 
subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions, see Wilson v. Garcia, 
471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985), which in Pennsylvania is two years, see Kach v. Hose, 589 
F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009).  The District Court determined that, even if the complaint 
related back, the claims were still time-barred.  As Appellees note, however, the two-year 
limitations period expired on Saturday, April 3, 2010.  Pursuant to Pennsylvania law, 
which excludes Saturdays and Sundays from the statute of limitations computation, the 
claims were timely filed on Monday, April 5, 2010.  See Pa. C.S.A. § 1908; see also Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 6(a).  
Appellees concede that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the 
excessive force claim against defendant Dickerson.  As the parties agree that the case 
should be remanded for further consideration of this claim as to this defendant, we need 
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not discuss it further.  Appellees argue that the grant of summary judgment for Krzywicki 
and Cassidy should be affirmed, nevertheless, because the record demonstrates that they 
“never used any force against” Fullman, and because he “makes no mention of them on 
appeal.”  The propriety of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment as to the 
claims against Krzywicki and Cassidy4 was not raised on appeal and is, therefore, 
waived.  In his brief, Fullman argues that the District Court erred in calculating the 
statute of limitations for his “related amended lawsuit alleging his left shoulder injury.”  
Although he argues the merits of his excessive force claim against Dickerson, he never 
references the other defendants or his claims against them, not even in response to 
Appellees’ arguments that these claims were waived.  Accordingly, although timely filed 
in the District Court, the claims against Krzywicki and Cassidy are not properly before 
us.  
Finally, we find no merit to Fullman’s argument that the District Court was biased 
against him because it referred to him as “a notorious and prolific litigant.”  We note that 
this reference was made by the District Court in a footnote in its order granting his 
motion to place the original complaints in suspense.  Neither this characterization nor any 
evidence in the record demonstrates that the judge’s comment constituted a 
predisposition against Fullman that resulted in an inability to render fair judgment.  See 
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“opinions formed by the judge on the 
                                              
4 These claims were not for excessive force; the claim against Krzywicki sounded in false 
arrest, and the claim against Cassidy was for the failure to provide medical attention 
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basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or 
of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they 
display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment 
impossible”).   
Based on the foregoing, we will vacate the District Court’s order to the extent it 
granted summary judgment as to the excessive force claim against defendant Dickerson, 
and we will remand for further proceedings.  We will affirm the judgment in all other 
respects.5   
 
                                                                                                                                                  
allegedly necessitated by Dickerson’s use of excessive force.  
5 Appellees’ motion to file a supplemental appendix is granted.  
